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Reading fiction is a major component of intellectual life, yet it has proven difficult to study
experimentally. One aspect of literature that has recently come to light is perspective
embedding (“she thought I left” embedding her perspective on “I left”), which seems
to be a defining feature of fiction. Previous work (Whalen et al., 2012) has shown
that increasing levels of embedment affects the time that it takes readers to read and
understand short vignettes in a moving window paradigm. With increasing levels of
embedment from 1 to 5, reading times in a moving window paradigm rose almost
linearly. However, level 0 was as slow as 3–4. Accuracy on probe questions was
relatively constant until dropping at the fifth level. Here, we assessed this effect in a more
ecologically valid (“typical”) reading paradigm, in which the entire vignette was visible
at once, either for as long as desired (Experiment 1) or a fixed time (Experiment 2). In
Experiment 1, reading times followed a pattern similar to that of the previous experiment,
with some differences in absolute speed. Accuracy matched previous results: fairly
consistent accuracy until a decline at level 5, indicating that both presentation methods
allowed understanding. In Experiment 2, accuracy was somewhat reduced, perhaps
because participants were less successful at allocating their attention than they were
during the earlier experiment; however, the pattern was the same. It seems that literature
does not, on average, use easiest reading level but rather uses a middle ground that
challenges the reader, but not too much.
Keywords: reading, perspective embedment, literature, theory of mind, fiction
INTRODUCTION
The reading of literature has received less attention in psychology than its ubiquity in culture
would lead us to expect (e.g., Mar and Oatley, 2008; Popova, 2014). Why we read ﬁction has been
a long-standing question with little consensus (e.g., Roche, 2008; Jusdanis, 2010). Whether it is for
entertainment, enlightenment, or educational requirement, the consumption of stories in a wide
range of genres remains a hallmark of human existence. One cognitive aspect of reading ﬁction
that has been studied by Zunshine (2006) is the embedding of perspective. A statement such as
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“I went to the store” is a (putative) fact, but “Alice knows I
went to the store” embeds that fact into Alice’s perspective.
Such “embedment” (Dunbar, 2000) is critical to understanding
a great deal of language, and much of literature (Zunshine,
2006, 2014). Zunshine’s (2014) estimation is that most literature
communicates ideas, observations and information at a third
level of embedment For example, in “She felt she knew
too much about Rudi to respect him” (Spark, 1963, p. 59);
the character has a mental representation of her attitude
toward Rudi (i.e., she doesn’t respect him), and this state
is embedded in her own knowledge of it, which is then
reﬂected in her current feeling. Sometimes literature reaches
the ﬁfth or sixth level. The ability to discuss perspectives
of those not present opens the possibility of considering the
perspective of “people” who were never present, that is, ﬁctional
characters.
Cognitive science, like linguistics, has often been concerned
primarily with the power of language to transfer and structure
information. Language is often taken as being primarily a
cognitive tool, a “system for expression of thought” (Chomsky,
1975, p. 57). Similarly, the organization and retrieval of
information is a central concern of psychology. The claimed
preference for embedment in literature, then, seems on the
surface to be contrary to our cognitive core. Although facts are
things that we typically care about and seem to be a major factor
in our linguistic structure, humans are social animals intent on
communication (e.g., Butterworth, 1994), which often depends
on the state of knowledge both of the speaker and the interlocutor,
that is, embedding of perspective.
There are many linguistic devices for conveying levels of
embedment. The ones used in the previous examples are the
most obvious, the “mental state” verbs (Zunshine, 2014). Some
languages, such as Shipibo-Konibo (Valenzuela, 2003) or Salar
(Dwyer, 2000), require a sentence to be marked grammatically
for the speaker’s engagement with the facts. The suﬃxes or other
morphemes encoding this information are called “evidentials”
and often mark whether a speaker knows the fact from personal
experience, has heard about it, or if it is a universally accepted
truth (Chafe and Nichols, 1986; Aikhenvald, 2004). Languages
that lack grammatical evidentials usually have periphrastic ways
of expressing the same meanings (“I see that you have a cough”
(direct evidence) vs. “I understand that you have a cough”
(reported evidence) vs. “One knows that coughs are dangerous”
(universal truth). Such devices signal an initial estimate of the
embedment level of a sentence, but they are not the only means
available to speakers and writers. Implied embedments can be
suggested by a variety of stylistic techniques, ranging from the
use of metaphor, aphorism, and allusion, to the strategic stripping
of the text from any references to mental states (Zunshine, 2011;
Bowes and Katz, 2015). For example, “I drove the motorcycle
half-way across the country” implies a perspective from which
the journey can be seen as only half-way and not simply a certain
number of miles. Such stylistic devices tend to accumulate in a
text, as discussed more fully in the cited articles.
Despite similarities, perspective embedment is not the same
as syntactic embedding or visual perspective-taking. Syntactic
embedding, a hallmark of human language (Chomsky, 1965),
can occur without an increase in perspective embedding. Thus
“she thought that he had left” embeds in both ways, while “she
saw the dog that bit the man” only embeds syntactically. It
is quite possible that perspective embedding usually requires
syntactic embedding, but the reverse is certainly not true. In
the same vein, participants have been shown to take the visual
perspective of a participant in a scene when they place “good”
and “bad” objects in a visual scene (e.g., Kominsky and Casasanto,
2013), but such an operation instead takes the original observers
perspective out of the situation rather than embedding it. That
is, it is not the participant’s perspective on the actor shown in
the picture (embedment), but rather the participant imagining
seeing the world from the actor’s perspective (a change rather
than an embedment). It is essentially an exchange rather than an
embedment.
Perspective embedment is essential for engaging readers
in ﬁction. (By ﬁction we mean novels, short stories, drama,
narrative poems, and memoirs focused on imagination and
consciousness.) Readers of ﬁction (typically) know that they are
reading about events and feelings that did not happen in the
real world, and yet they can become deeply immersed in those
stories. The ability of language to draw us into such stories is
probably unique to human language (Hockett, 1960) and appears
early in acquisition. By preschool, children show the capacity
to contemplate embedded mental states; the ability correlates
positively with rich vocabulary and practices of story-reading,
and this correlation becomes even stronger as children grow older
(Peskin and Astington, 2004; Harris, 2005).
Fictional embedment of mental states is arguably related to
our tendency to construct complex embedments in our daily
social life (Zunshine, 2015), yet one can argue that popular
literature makes use of more overt indicators than does literature
in the canon. Works of ﬁction taught in literature classes
make their readers work harder at ﬁguring out embedded
mental states (Zunshine, 2014). The perceptual processes and
cognitive tasks that occur during reading (both of literature
and other texts) are numerous (e.g., Pugh et al., 1996; Rayner
et al., 2001; Long et al., 2006; McNamara and Magliano, 2009;
Forrest-Pressley and Waller, 2013). There are always aspects
of reading that correlate, even if they are dissociable at some
level. The present experiments will not be able to determine
the exact level of cognitive assessment of our texts. Instead,
they present responses to texts that have been designed to
vary a dimension, perspective embedment, that has not been
addressed by others. Only future work will be able to deﬁne
the cognitive processes involved more completely, but we
hypothesize that constructing interpretations of embedment is
one more process that can be identiﬁed. The mechanics of
that construction remain to be determined. As an ancillary,
we explore whether having only one actor in a vignette versus
having three impacts reading time and, by inference, processing
time.
In our previous study of embedment (Whalen et al., 2012), we
used reading time as an index of processing diﬃculty (cf. Rayner
et al., 2006; Feng et al., 2013). We constructed vignettes of a
consistent length that varied in the level of embedment. Those
with no mental states were at level 0, while adding one or more
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mental state allowed us to increase the embedment from 1 to
5, and, by assumption, increased complexity. Every sentence in
every vignette was judged by us to be at the stated embedment
level. These judgments have been found to be largely replicable
(Whalen et al., submitted-b). A further manipulation was to
have only one actor in the vignette (the narrator “I”) or three.
If the mental states of a single individual were not challenging
in the same way as mental states for a variety of actors, then
increasing embedment for the single actor vignettes might not
increase in complexity in the same way as the three actor ones.
We found that vignettes with embedment levels ranging from
1 to 5 increased reading time almost linearly, while level 0 was
between 3 and 4 in reading time. The pattern was basically the
same for the single actor and the three actor vignettes, although
the single actor ones were consistently somewhat faster. We
concluded that mental states do increase the mental processing
that must go on during reading, even though we were unable
to determine the exact nature of those processes from those two
experiments.
In the previous study, a moving-window paradigm (e.g., Just
et al., 1982) was used to ensure that regressions (i.e., re-reading
text) would not occur, given that regressions, though natural,
greatly aﬀect overall reading time and are themselves more
common in diﬃcult texts (e.g., Rayner and Well, 1996; Rayner
et al., 2006). However, that paradigm also introduces a level of
unnaturalness in the reading process that might interact with the
eﬀects of embedments. To explore this possibility, the present
experiments replicated the earlier study with full presentation
of the vignettes (that is, “typical” presentation), either for a
participant-determined amount of time (Experiment 1) or for a
ﬁxed amount of time (Experiment 2).
EXPERIMENT 1
In Whalen et al. (2012), vignettes of a consistent length were
presented in the moving-window paradigm to allow us to
obtain reading times with no regressions. Although eliminating
regressions, this demanded of participants an unpracticed form
of reading, which may have led to unanticipated strategies for
comprehension. The present study was designed to avoid that
possibility by allowing the participants to view the entire vignette
at once, as is the case with most reading situations. We then
compared their reading times and accuracy on probe questions to
the results from the earlier study. We expected the more natural
reading situation to lead to longer reading times (presumably
including regressions) and somewhat more accurate responses,
although many of the previous accuracy levels were near ceiling.
Methods
Participants
The participants were 16 college educated young adults (10
female) with no reported speech or language pathologies. They
were paid for their participation. All signed a consent form
approved by the City University of New York Institutional
Review Board.
Stimuli
The 84 vignettes of Whalen et al. (2012) were used (available at
https://yale.box.com/s/qvk12d3vwrppimedrrdkkj5hgrdq5p76).
These were designed to have embedment levels ranging
from 0 to 5; the reliability of these designations has been
established earlier (Whalen et al., submitted-b). There were
either three actors or one (the narrator, “I”); the narrator
was often an actor in the three actor vignettes. The addition
of explicit characters allowed us to examine whether the
“virtual” actor in the one-actor vignettes took as much time
to encode as the genuine additional actors. There were
seven vignettes at each of these 12 combinations of actors
and embedments. Every sentence was designed to be at the
target embedment level. We ensured that the number of text
characters (including the alphabetic ones and punctuation,
but excluding spaces) in each vignette was 350. They averaged
426.1 characters with spaces (ranging from 412 to 436). The
number of lines presented was always 7. This facilitated the
earlier study’s use of the moving window technique. The
last line was always about half as long as the other lines.
The number of punctuation marks averaged 6.2 (ranging
from 5 to 9). The number of sentences averaged 4.6 (ranging
from 2 to 10) while the number of words per sentence
averaged 20.2 (ranging by vignette from 9.4 to 42.0). The
number of words per vignette averaged 84.4 (ranging from 69
to 95).
Each vignette was followed by a probe question.
To ensure a full reading of the vignette, that question
was typically designed to require analysis at the highest
level of embedment. This was to prevent a strategy of
reading quickly for the most superﬁcial facts. For the
higher levels of embedment, it was diﬃcult to construct
a short question that was dependent on the embedment
and yet with a clear “yes/no” answer. Thus some of
the “incorrect” answers at higher levels are, in fact,
open to legitimate disagreements. Nonetheless, to be
consistent with the previous study, the designated correct
answer is taken as the correct answer here. Note that
the high level of agreement on levels 0–4 was taken as
validation of our assignment of correctness of the probe
questions.
Procedure
Vignettes were presented as typical text, that is, with all words
presented at once rather than one segment at a time as
had been done in the previous, moving-window experiments.
The text appeared on a computer screen under the control
of the computer program Presentation R© (www.neurobs.com).
The participants were instructed to read each vignette for as
long as they thought they needed to in order to be able to
answer a yes/no question about the content. Once they had
ﬁnished reading, they pressed a key, and the probe question
replaced the vignette on the screen. The probe question remained
available for 7 s. No time pressure was stated for this judgment
(other than the 7 s limit). A diﬀerent order of vignettes
was used for each participant, and each responded to every
vignette.
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Results
Reading Time
Allreading times for all the vignettes were analyzed regardless of
the correctness of the answer. This was the technique used in the
previous study, based on the fact that level 5 had disproportionate
numbers of errors. Visual inspection of means with and without
errors showed no diﬀerences in the pattern of results. It can be
assumed that errors did not aﬀect the reading time of the vignette
being probed, and the lack of time pressure (and feedback)
meant that the upcoming reading time was unlikely to be aﬀected
either.
A linear mixed eﬀects model (LME) was performed using the
lmer function from the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2013) in R,
version 3.2.2 (R Core Team, 2015). An analysis with random
slopes and intercepts failed to converge, so the simpler analysis
with intercepts only was performed, as recommended by Barr
et al. (2013). This analysis had the ﬁxed the factors Embed
(ordered nominal levels 0–5) and Actors (1 or 3 actors); the
interactions were tested as well. Reading time was the dependent
variable with crossed random intercepts for participant and item.
Results are shown in Table 1.
The reading times showed essentially the same pattern as
in the previous results (Figure 1), although overall times were
longer (by an average of 1.13 s), substantially so at the ﬁfth level
(7.82 s).
A second LME analysis compared the results with those of
Whalen et al. (2012) by adding the ﬁxed eﬀect Experiment
[current (full) vs. previous (window)].
Interactions tested were Embed by Experiment and Actors
by Experiment. The three-way interaction did not converge.
Because the resulting table is quite large and mostly non-
signiﬁcant, only those eﬀects with conﬁdence intervals that do
not include zero are reported here. Reading times for Embedment
level 1 were shorter in the current experiment (t = −0.217,
CI = −3558.7/−184.3). For Embedment levels 4 and 5, times
were longer in the current experiment (t = 2.82 and 3.79
respectively, CI = 740.6/4115.1 and 1578.2/4952.6). The three
Actor vignettes took longer to read in the present experiment
(t = 5.78, CI= 1897.0/3845.2).
Accuracy
Accuracy on the probe questions was quite good except for the
level 5 and, for the three actor vignettes, the level 4 (see Figure 2).
The present results showed a similar pattern to previous results,
as seen in Figure 2.
A generalized linear mixed model with logistic regression
(GLM; glmer from the lme4 package in R) was performed with
the factors Embed (levels 0–5), Actors (1 or 3 actors) and crossed
random intercepts for participant and item. Response accuracy
(0 or 1) was the dependent variable. Table 2A presents the results
for Experiment 1, with comparisons made to Embedment Level 5
rather than 0, as the previous experiment had shown that level to
be the one that was diﬀerent from the others. It was found to be
diﬀerent from levels 1, 2, and 3, but not 0 and 4. The number of
actors did not aﬀect the accuracy.
A second analysis compared the current results with those
from the previous study by adding the ﬁxed eﬀect Experiment
[window (previous) vs. full (current)]. Models with interactions
FIGURE 1 | Comparison of current results (solid lines) with those of
Experiment 1 of Whalen et al. (2012) (dashed lines, “window”). Reading
times are averaged across participant and vignette. Error bars represent one
SEM.
TABLE 1 | Linear mixed effects model (LME) of reading times for Experiment 1.
Estimate Standard error t value Confidence interval
(Intercept) 21471.0 1784.8 12.030 17941.6 25000.3
Embed 1 −3355.8 1061.5 −3.161 −5382.7 −1328.9
Embed 2 −1844.3 1061.5 −1.737 −3871.2 182.5715
Embed 3 −705.1 1061.5 −0.664 −27312.0 1321.8
Embed 4 1965.7 1061.5 1.852 −61.2 3992.6
Embed 5 3708.0 1061.5 3.493 1681.1 5734.9
Three actors (v. 1) 3902.8 612.9 6.368 2732.6 5073.0
Embed 1 ∗ 3 Actors −866.9 2045.3 −0.424 −4643.4 2909.7
Embed 2 ∗ 3 Actors 887.8 2045.3 0.434 −2888.7 4664.4
Embed 3 ∗ 3 Actors 113.3 2045.3 −0.055 −3889.9 3663.2
Embed 4 ∗ 3 Actors 2112.0 2045.3 1.033 −1664.5 5888.6
Embed 5 ∗ 3 Actors 5017.7 2045.3 2.453 1241.1 8794.2
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FIGURE 2 | Accuracy for Experiment 1 (solid lines) compared with
those of Experiment 1 of Whalen et al. (2012) (dashed lines, “window”).
Error bars are one SEM.
that included Actors did not converge, so only the interaction
between Experiment and Embedment was analyzed. As Table 2B
shows, all the Embedment levels were distinct from 5 on this
analysis, and there were interactions between Experiment and
levels 0 and 1.
Discussion
Readers took longer to read vignettes as the embedment
level increased from 1 to 5. Level 0, however, was between
TABLE 2 | GLMM of percent correct: (A) Experiment 1, (B) Comparing
previous experiment.
Estimate Standard error z value Pr(>|z|)
(A)
Embed 4 0.858 0.470 1.826 0.068
Embed 3 1.189 0.479 2.484 0.013∗
Embed 2 1.100 0.477 2.304 0.021∗
Embed 1 1.314 0.486 2.704 0.006∗∗
Embed 0 0.774 0.468 1.652 0.098
Three Actor 0.206 0.283 0.729 0.466
(B)
Embed 4 1.233 0.460 2.680 0.007∗∗
Embed 3 1.295 0.461 2.808 0.005∗∗
Embed 2 1.573 0.472 3.335 0.0009∗∗∗
Embed 1 2.146 0.496 4.329 1.5e-05∗∗∗
Embed 0 1.628 0.474 3.435 0.0006∗∗∗
Three actor 0.169 0.25429 0.663 0.507
Experiment 0.370 0.257 1.443 0.149
Embed 4 ∗ Experiment -0.409 0.357 -1.145 0.252
Embed 3 ∗ Experiment -0.098 0.372 -0.262 0.793
Embed 2 ∗ Experiment -0.41 0.374 -1.111 0.266
Embed 1 ∗ Experiment -0.855 0.410 -2.083 0.037∗
Embed 0 ∗ Experiment -0.845 0.369 -2.290 0.022∗
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
3 and 4. The added complexity of multiple perspectives
seems to have led readers to spend more time understanding
the texts. Accuracy on the probe questions only dropped
oﬀ at level 5, which also included some questions with
arguably ambiguous answers. The longer times at level 0
could either be due to a lack of engagement on the part
of the reader, or perhaps to a greater density of factual
information. Current measures of information density do
not provide any direct answer to this possible diﬀerence.
Vignettes with three actors elicited longer reading times than
those with one actor, a further indication of the eﬀects of
complexity of the text on reading time. For either number of
actors, the steady increases in reading time due to increasing
embedment indicate that perspective requires some processing
even when only one person is involved. That is, in the one
actor vignettes, the narrator’s perspective on the story acts
is equivalent to a “virtual person” as far as reading time is
concerned.
The presentation of text in the current experiment was
much closer to the way reading is typically performed, yet
the results were similar to those obtained with the moving
window technique (Whalen et al., 2012). Although the reading
times were, on average, longer than in the moving-window
experiment (23.4 vs. 22.3 s), they did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly,
even though the full presentation was more practiced than
the moving-window version. We do not know how many
regressions occurred during the reading, because we did not
use an eye-tracker. However, regressions are normal and would
be expected to rise as diﬃculty rises, consequently increasing
reading time. Indeed, reading times in this study were sometimes
faster than in the earlier study (for level 1). So the lack of
pressure on reading time and presentation method allowed for
even more attention to the level 5 vignettes, particularly for
the three actor ones. This further conﬁrms that the diﬃculty
we inferred before is present even in a more normal reading
style.
There was virtually no diﬀerence in accuracy between the
present results and the earlier ones. Any null eﬀect must be
treated with caution, of course, especially with relatively small
sample sizes. Nonetheless, individual points along the continuum
diﬀered a bit, but the overall pattern was the same: only the
diﬃcult questions at level 5 caused a signiﬁcant decline in
accuracy. There was no obvious beneﬁt to using a typical reading
paradigm rather than the moving-window presentation as in
the earlier study. This decline occurred despite (or perhaps
because of) the additional time taken in reading the level 5
vignettes in the current study. As mentioned, the construction
of the probe questions for level 5 was diﬃcult because we
needed short yes/no questions that occasionally depended on
understanding the higher embedment per se. Some of the answers
could have been argued with; it may be that these disagreements
were given greater weight with the increased time to encode
the vignettes. In any event, it is clear that the overall pattern
was the same in both experiments, further supporting the idea
that the probe questions were successful at ensuring that the
vignettes were read fully and that there was no speed-accuracy
trade-oﬀ.
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EXPERIMENT 2
The second experiment mirrored the second experiment of
Whalen et al. (2012) in that the vignette was always visible for
23 s, no matter what its embedment level. That duration had
been chosen to prepare for a functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) study (Whalen et al., submitted-a). In the
moving-window paradigm, the participants could tell when the
vignette was about to end. With the full-paragraph presentation
used here, they could not. Therefore, we added a visible
countdown of the total number of seconds so that any last
second (re)readings could be performed. Despite the results
of Experiment 1, it was still our prediction that the typical
reading style available to the participants in this experiment
(in contrast to the earlier study) would result in more accurate
responses.
Methods
Participants
The participants were 12 college-educated young adults (six
female) with no reported speech or language pathologies.
Three had acquired English early (before 7 years of
age) but not ﬁrst; all considered English their primary
language. They were paid for their participation. None
had participated in Experiment 1. All signed a consent
form approved by the CUNY Institutional Review
Board.
Stimuli
The stimuli were those of Experiment 1.
Procedure
Participants were instructed to read the vignettes for 23 s. There
was a number in the lower left of the screen that counted
down from 23 to 0, so that they could tell when the time
was running out. They were told to answer the yes/no probe
question that came afterward; it remained available for 7 s, as
in the previous experiment. No time pressure was stated for this
judgment (other than the 7 s limit). The next vignette appeared
after a 2-s pause. There was an option to take a break after 42
vignettes.
Results
Overall, responses were 73.1% accurate, treating both incorrect
responses and the 1.5% missing responses as errors. This
compares with 82.8% in Experiment 1. It is also lower than the
86.2% of Experiment 2 of Whalen et al. (2012). The pattern of
errors, however, was very similar in those two experiments (see
Figure 3).
A generalized linear mixed model with logistic regression
(GLM; glmer from the lme4 package in R) was performed
with the factors Embed (levels 0–5), Actors (1 or 3
actors), the interaction, and crossed random intercepts for
participant and item. (An analysis with random slopes,
as with the ﬁrst experiment, did not converge.) Response
accuracy (0 or 1) was the dependent variable. Table 3A
presents the results for Experiment 2, with comparisons
FIGURE 3 | Accuracy for Experiment 2 (solid lines) compared with
those of Experiment 2 of Whalen et al. (2012) (dashed lines, “window”).
Error bars are one SEM.
made to Embedment Level 5 rather than 0, as with
Experiment 1. It was found to be diﬀerent from levels
0, 1, and 2, but not 3 and 4. The number of actors did
not aﬀect the accuracy, and none of the interactions were
signiﬁcant.
TABLE 3 | GLMM of accuracy data: (A) Experiment 2; (B) comparison with
earlier study.
Estimate Standard error z value Pr(>| z|)
(A)
Embed 4 0.675 0.536 1.26 0.209
Embed 3 0.724 0.542 1.34 0.182
Embed 2 1.127 0.550 2.05 0.040∗
Embed 1 1.090 0.551 1.98 0.048∗
Embed 0 1.253 0.557 2.25 0.024∗
Three actor −0.237 0.521 −0.45 0.650
Embed 4 ∗ 3 Actor −0.283 0.752 −0.377 0.706
Embed 3 ∗ 3 Actor 0.305 0.762 0.401 0.689
Embed 2 ∗ 3 Actor −0.017 0.772 −0.022 0.983
Embed 1 ∗ 3 Actor 0.539 0.784 0.69 0.492
Embed 0 ∗ 3 Actor −0.769 0.765 −1.01 0.314
(B)
Embed 4 1.2188 0.510 2.39 0.017∗
Embed 3 2.3521 0.582 4.04 5.35e-05∗∗∗
Embed 2 1.5951 0.524 3.04 0.002∗∗
Embed 1 1.7624 0.534 3.30 0.001∗∗∗
Embed 0 1.3969 0.511 2.71 0.007∗∗
Three actor −0.3712 0.261 −1.42 0.155
Experiment −0.5360 0.379 −1.41 0.158
Embed 4 ∗ Experiment −0.6407 0.421 −1.52 0.128
Embed 3 ∗ Experiment −1.4256 0.504 −2.82 0.005∗∗
Embed 2 ∗ Experiment −0.3828 0.440 −0.87 0.384
Embed 1 ∗ Experiment −0.2804 0.455 −0.61 0.538
Embed 0 ∗ Experiment −0.4941 0.426 −1.16 0.246
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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Table 3B shows the comparison with the previous study,
as before. Every embedment level diﬀered signiﬁcantly from
level 5. Experiment did not appear as a main eﬀect. Only
Embedment level 3 entered into an interaction with Experiment.
Because many of the distributions of errors between the two
studies were non-overlapping (Figure 3), a separate GLMM
with only the factor Experiment was run. A z value of
−3.25 (p = 0.001∗∗) was found. Given the small sample
size and the lack of an eﬀect in the larger analysis, this
result should also be treated with caution. Overall, however,
there is no evidence that the typical presentation improved
performance over the moving window presentation of the earlier
study.
Discussion
The reading time available to participants was the same as
in the second experiment of the previous study, but the
experience seems not to have been the same. With the moving-
window technique, the participants did not need to plan
their reading strategy nor to keep track of the time, because
they had no control over it; here, they needed to plan for
the conclusion of the reading time. It is possible that the
timer we used was not eﬀective in signaling the stimulus’s
approaching end, but that was not the typical report from
participants; they said that the timer was annoying at ﬁrst
but routine by the end. It is more likely that the need
to divide attention between reading and timing reduced the
uptake of information. However, the overall pattern, with
only level 5 being signiﬁcantly worse, was the same in both
experiments
The decline in accuracy from the window presentation to
the full paragraph presentation demonstrates that an unusual
presentation method for reading does not necessarily lead to
less eﬃcient reading. This decline could be due to (perhaps
unnecessary) regressions; because participants expected to get
more out of a vignette when they could see it in its entirety,
or some other cause. In any event, the more natural condition
of presenting the text in its entirety, rather than a segment at a
time, led to worse performance. It seems unlikely that preventing
regressions leads to better comprehension in general, but we do
not know of any direct test of that possibility.
COMPARISON WITH DISCOURSE
MEASURES
The focus of these experiments has been on perspective
embedment, but, as noted in the Introduction, there are
necessary correlations with other phenomena. Again, perspective
embedment is diﬀerent from syntactic embedding, but it typically
requires more complex syntax, especially with the overt verbs
of cognition used here. There are also many other factors that
aﬀect reading time, such as word frequency, that could not
be controlled in the design of these vignettes. As a qualitative
assessment, we compare the results from Experiment 1 to various
metrics generated by Coh-Metrix (McNamara et al., 2014). Some
of the comparisons are qualitative due to the short length of our
texts [they averaged 84.4 words per vignette, while McNamara
et al. (2014, pp. 153–154) recommend a minimum of 100], and
the relatively small sample size of the present experiment. Some
measures, such as average sentence length and word frequency,
are not aﬀected by the size of the text and can be correlated with
embedment level. The Coh-Metrix index is given with the r value.
The number of sentences decreased with increasing
embedment (DESSC, r = −0.733, p < 0.001; all dfs in this
section are 82, means are in Table 4). Sentence length, therefore,
increased with higher embedment (DESSL, r = 0.800, p< 0.001).
The number of syllables per word increased slightly with
embedment level (DESWLsy, r = 0.246, p < 0.05). Word
frequency for content words as measured in the CELEX database
(Baayen et al., 1995) was not deliberately controlled, but it
turned out not to correlate with embedment level (WRDFRQc,
r = 0.009, n.s.).
Portions of the pattern for several reading diﬃculty measures
are consistent with the reading times in Experiment 1, but the
diﬀerences are instructive. The Flesch Reading Ease measure
(Flesch, 1948) and the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level (Kincaid et al.,
1975) were taken from the algorithm of McNamara et al. (2014).
They mirrored the overall pattern for embedment, largely due to
the inﬂuence of sentence length, which covaried to some extent
with embedment but increased for the level 0 vignettes. However,
the values for the three actors vignettes are measured as being
more readable than those of the one actor at every embedment
level; this is the opposite was found in the reading times. Further,
TABLE 4 | Values of selected indices from McNamara et al. (2014), averaged across vignettes.
Embedment
level
# Sentences per
vignette
# Words per
sentence
# Syllables per
word
CELEX word
frequency
Flesch Reading
Ease
Flesch Reading
Ease, one actor
Flesch Reading
Ease, three
actors
Flesch-Kincaid
Grade Level
0 5.21 16.38 1.38 2.35 73.35 73.35 73.36 7.10
1 6.29 14.29 1.29 2.45 83.01 81.65 84.36 5.23
2 5.71 15.39 1.32 2.62 79.33 76.00 82.66 6.02
3 4.36 19.32 1.38 2.43 70.70 68.79 72.62 8.20
4 3.21 26.17 1.41 2.42 60.61 57.91 63.31 11.31
5 2.86 29.77 1.40 2.48 58.60 53.78 63.42 12.48
N = 84 for most columns, 42 for the 1 and 3 actor measures of the Flesch Reading Ease columns. Coh-Metrix indices are: DESSC, number of sentences; DESSL,
average sentence length; DESWLsy, average number of syllables per word; WRDFRQc, average CELEX word frequency for content words; RDFRE, Flesch Reading Ease;
and RDFKGL, Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level.
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the level 0 vignettes are placed between levels 2 and 3 in the
reading measures, but between 3 and 4 in Experiment 1’s reading
times.
We should not expect to be able to distinguish all of these
factors with any one experimental stimulus set, much less one
that is exploring a factor for the ﬁrst time. The present results
should provide a stimulus to further study to examine the eﬀects
of these new factors. We would expect that including some
aspects of perspective embedment would lead to better measures
of readability. As a ﬁrst pass, treating verbs that usually signal
embedment (think, know, believe) could be coded in addition to
current factors.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present experiments show that adding multiple viewpoints
on the information in a vignette—perspective embedment—
increased reading time in a self-paced task for those vignettes
with some embedment. In Experiment 1, for vignettes without
embedment (“Level 0”), reading times were between those of
levels 3 and 4. Accuracy on probe questions did not decline until
level 5. It appears that the additional complexity of the multiple
perspectives makes reading more diﬃcult. Level 0 may be slow
due to lack of engagement (i.e., readers expect stories to include
human perspectives) or to an overall increase in the number of
details in those vignettes; measurements of information density,
which might distinguish these possibilities, do not currently
provide an answer. In Experiment 2, with reading time ﬁxed,
accuracy dropped. It is likely that participants did not adopt a
strategy that allowed for complete readings. The time allowed
(23 s) replicated the times used in our earlier study (Whalen et al.,
2012) for a moving window display. Because regressions were
possible in this experiment, it may be that participants made use
of them even though there was insuﬃcient time to beneﬁt from
them. An eye-tracking study would help resolve this question.
The pattern of errors, however, was similar to Experiment 1 and
the previous study, with level 5 being the lowest. Overall, the
present results indicate that a reader’s experience with a text is
aﬀected by the structure of the information given by the diﬀering
perspectives of the actors within that text.
The results from the present experiments were similar to
those from the previous study despite their more natural reading
conditions. Our expectation that natural reading conditions,
including the one in which the participants could read the text
for as long as they wished, would lead to greater accuracy on
the probe questions was not met. Instead, there was a noticeable
decrement in accuracy; the reason for this decline is unclear. It
may have to do with the use of regressions in reading. Regressions
are natural in reading and help the reader understand diﬃcult
or ambiguous material. Allowing regressions in Experiment 1,
however, did not lead to improved accuracy over the previous
study (where regressions were not allowed). In Experiment 2,
where there was a time constraint, the time taken for the
regressions may have given the reader a better understanding
of the particular sentence that elicited the regression, but that
may have left too little time for reading the rest of the sentences.
Alternatively, it could be that preventing regressions improves
reading understanding, perhaps by forcing greater attention as
the information progresses. This has not, to our knowledge,
been tested, but it would be similar to the decline in memory
tasks when participants believed that they would be able to look
up the information repeatedly on the internet (Sparrow et al.,
2011). Further, longer reading times have been linked with greater
acceptance of misinformation from ﬁctional short stories (Fazio
and Marsh, 2008), suggesting that extending the time allowed
to process information is not always helpful. Only further work
would clarify this.
The present experiments measured levels of embedment in
sentences and short vignettes, so the question arises whether
such stimuli adequately model what is going on in works of
ﬁction. At the least, such judgments can be made on extracts from
novels, as shown in Experiment 2 of Whalen et al., submitted-b.
There, the ﬁrst 12 sentences of “To Kill a Mockingbird” (Lee,
1960) were analyzed by the experimenters and by students of
literature. For those, the agreement on embedment level was
49.3% (compared with 74.5% for the vignettes). The judgments
are clearly less consistent for this segment of literature, eliciting
less consistent judgments than in the present experiments
and raising interesting questions about the reasons for the
diﬀerences.
The vignettes under study here have also been presented to
participants in an fMRI experiment (Whalen et al., submitted-a).
Regions associated with Theory of Mind were more active
for vignettes with embedments than for those lacking them
altogether. Although those results are preliminary, they indicate
that the process of reading ﬁction recruits brain regions arguably
responsible for complex embedments that structure our social
life (e.g., I didn’t want my boss to know what I was thinking).
Works of ﬁction intensify such real-life embedments, foreground
their emotional salience, and drastically increase the frequency
of their appearance, but their underlying structure (i.e., mental
states within other mental states) is preserved.
The experiments reported here and in our related publications
indicate that readers are sensitive to diﬀerent levels of
embedment and that experimenters can be reasonably consistent
in their assigning the levels. Given that describing the level of
embedment in connected discourse is an important new way of
interpreting the information structure of texts, evidence of such
consistency is encouraging.
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